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The Secretary 
Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee 
Parliament House 
Canberra ACT 2600 
 
Att: Mr Peter Hallahan 
 
4 November 2002 
 
 
Dear Sir\Madam, 
 
Submission to Inquiry Into ASIO Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (Cth) by 
Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee 
 
Thank you for your e-mail of 22 October 2002 inviting a submission to the inquiry by the Senate 
Legal and Constitutional References Committee into the ASIO Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) 
Bill 2002 (Cth). My submission is set out below. 
 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
This submission concentrates upon the following terms of reference for the inquiry: 
 
. The development of an alternative regime for questioning to obtain intelligence relating to 
terrorism 
 
. Recent overseas legislation dealing with the investigation of potential terrorist activities or 
offences 
 
. Whether the bill in its current or amended form is constitutionally sound 
 
. The implications for civil and political rights of the bill 
 
 
Whilst the report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on the ASIO Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill 2002 (Cth) proposed a number of sensible amendments to the bill, the intense time 
constraints for the inquiry and the lack of senior legal counsel appointed to assist the Committee 
meant that the Committee’s recommendations failed to address three critical issues: Firstly, the 
unacceptability of incommunicado detention of non-suspect citizens as a method of collecting 
intelligence. Secondly, real doubts about the constitutionality of executive detention. Thirdly, the 
availability of effective, non-detention alternatives already enacted in other jurisdictions such as 
Canada and the United Kingdom that are adaptable to Australian circumstances.    
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B. INCOMMUNICADO DETENTION UNDER THE BILL: 
BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AND POLITICAL 
RIGHTS 
 
. Incommunicado detention: an overview of the bill 
 
A person who has been taken into custody, or detained, under this Division is not 
permitted to contact, and may be prevented from contacting, anyone at any time while in 
custody or detention.1 
 
The first issue is the unacceptability in a democratic society of incommunicado detention of 
persons not suspected of offences and the real risk of substantial abuses of human rights such 
detention creates. 
 
The fact that post September 11, comparable democracies such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand have not legislated for incommunicado detention of non 
suspect citizens, highlights the anomalous and draconian nature of the Australian bill.     
 
It is important to remember that persons detained and interrogated under an amended version of the 
bill, potentially including journalists, religious and ethnic leaders, commentators and politicians, 
friends and neighbours, will still have fewer rights than those arrested for, and charged with, actual 
terrorist offences under the Commonwealth Criminal Code.   
 
Those arrested in connection with a terrorist offence would be subject to the arrest, forensic and 
investigatory protections of Parts 1AA, 1C and 1D of the Commonwealth Crimes Act. Under the 
Commonwealth Crimes Act arrest provisions, reasonable grounds must exist that the person has 
committed or is committing an offence against a law of the Commonwealth. 
 
It would still be the case with the amended version of the bill that a person detained would 
effectively disappear for up to 168 hours (1 week). There is no right for the detainee to notify a 
friend, relative or other interested person of their whereabouts after a set period of detention. There 
is no right of legal representation of a detainee during the first 48 hours of detention. 
 
 
. Incommunicado detention and other issues: breaches of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 
Various clauses of the amended bill continue to breach several of the provisions of the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. 
 
Australia has ratified the ICCPR and acceded to the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, allowing 
individual communications alleging ICCPR breaches to be made to the UN Human Rights 
Committee in Geneva. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 S.34 F (8). 
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. ICCPR: Art 7: (prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment): 
 
Key requirements of UN Human Rights Committee General Comment 20 on Art 7: 
 
. Text of Art 7 allows no limitation, no derogation from provisions of Art 7 allowed, even in 
situations of public emergency such as those referred to in Art 4 of ICCPR 
 
. Prohibition extends to acts that cause mental suffering to the victim 
 
. Not sufficient for implementation of Art 7 to prohibit such treatment or to make it a crime. States 
Parties to ICCPR are required to inform the HRC of the legislative, administrative, judicial and 
other measures they take to prevent and punish acts of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment in any territory under their jurisdiction 
 
. Enforcement personnel, medical personnel, police officers and any other persons involved in the 
custody or treatment of any individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment 
must receive appropriate instruction and training 
 
. To guarantee effective protection of detained persons, provisions should be made for detainees to 
be held in places officially recognised as places of detention and for their names and places of 
detention, as well as for the names of persons responsible for their detention, to be kept in registers 
readily available and accessible to those concerned 
 
. Incommunicado detention is specifically prohibited under Art 7: 
 
“Provisions should also be made against incommunicado detention…The protection of the 
detainee also requires that prompt and regular access be given to doctors and lawyers and, 
under appropriate supervision when the investigation so requires, to family members 
 
Accordingly, the bill breaches Art 7 by: 
 
. Instituting  per se a system of incommunicado detention 
 
. Doing little more than including a general prohibition against cruel, inhumane or degrading 
treatment or punishment, with an offence for knowingly contravening the general prohibition ie a 
lack of sufficient safeguards 
 
. Denying access to an approved lawyer for the first 48 hours 
 
. Making no provision for access to doctors 
 
. Denying access under appropriate supervision to family members 
 
. Not establishing officially recognised places of detention  
 
. Not establishing registers recording appropriate details of detention 
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. Not establishing effective immediate mechanisms for intervention by the Inspector-General of 
Intelligence and Security and the Ombudsman upon complaint by the detainee of improper 
treatment  
 
 
ICCPR : Art 10: (positive requirement that all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated 
with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person) 
 
Key requirements of UN Human Rights Committee General Comment 21 on Art 10: 
 
. Persons deprived of their liberty may not be subjected to any hardship or constraint other than that 
resulting from the deprivation of liberty. 
 
. Respect for the dignity of such persons must be guaranteed under the same conditions as for that 
of free persons 
 
. Persons deprived of liberty enjoy all the rights set forth in the ICCPR, subject to the restrictions 
that are unavoidable in a closed environment 
 
Therefore, as Art 10, paragraph 1 imposes a positive obligation towards persons who are 
particularly vulnerable because of their status as persons deprived of their liberty, the positive 
requirements complement the prohibitions in Art 7. 
 
The bill arguably breaches Art 10 by not specifying any provisions for fulfilment of the positive 
obligations of Art 10, other than including a requirement that the person be treated with humanity 
and respect for human dignity with an offence for knowingly contravening the general prohibition 
 
 
ICCPR: Art 9 
 
Key requirements of UN Human Rights Committee General Comment 8 on Art 9: 
 
Where preventive detention is used, for reasons of public security, it must be controlled by these 
same provisions ie it must not be arbitrary, must be based on grounds and procedures established 
by law, information of the reasons must be given and court control of the detention must be 
available as well as compensation in case of a breach 
 
ICCPR: Art 9 (1): (applicable in all deprivations of liberty): Arrest or detention must not be 
“arbitrary” 
 
Meaning of “arbitrary” has been found to include elements such as inappropriateness, injustice and 
unpredictability: Van Alphen v Netherlands Communication 305/1988 and disproportionality in the 
circumstances: A v Australia Communication 560/1993 
 
The capacity for detention without criminal charge potentially violates Art 9(1) where it is not 
reasonable in all the circumstances: Van Alphen v Netherlands Communication 305/1988 
 
The bill may breach the Art 9(1) prohibition against arbitrariness as the grounds for obtaining a 
warrant for detention “that there are reasonable grounds for believing that issuing the warrant to be 
requested will substantially assist the collection of intelligence that is important in relation to a 
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terrorism offence” are very broad, and applied in some situations, will be unreasonable and 
inappropriate. 
 
ICCPR Art 9 (2) (Persons arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for arrest) 
 
The bill breaches Art 9 (2) as it makes no explicit provision for this requirement on arrest. See 34 
D (2)(b)(i) and 34 DA. The prescribed authority’s explanation similarly does not satisfy this 
requirement: 34E 
 
ICCPR Art 9 (4) (a right to control by a court of the legality of the detention applies to all 
deprivations of liberty): “shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court 
may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is 
not lawful” 
 
The bill arguably breaches Art 9 (4) as it withholds access to an approved lawyer for the first 48 
hours and therefore frustrates or negates effective exercise of the 34E (1)(f) and 34E (3) right by 
the detainee to seek from a federal court a remedy relating to the detention warrant or treatment in 
connection with the warrant  
 
ICCPR Art 9 (5) requires an enforceable right to compensation for a victim of unlawful arrest or 
detention 
 
The bill arguably breaches Art 9 (5) as it includes no provision as to an enforceable mechanism 
for compensation 
 
 ICCPR Art 14  (a range of due process rights, potentially relevant in relation to the offences in 
34G  comprising the obligation to appear before the prescribed authority, to give information and to 
produce things) 
 
ICCPR Art 14 (2) (Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed 
innocent until proven guilty according to law) 
 
The strict liability aspect of the 34G(1) offence and the evidential burdens on the defendant in the 
34G (3) and 34G (6) offences may breach Article 14(2). 
 
ICCPR Art 14 (3)(b) (In the determination of any criminal charge against him, entitlement to 
minimum guarantee to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to 
communicate with counsel of his own choosing 
 
Incommunicado detention, with access to an approved lawyer denied for the first 48 hours, and the 
prohibition against consulting that approved lawyer in private, may breach the Art 14 (3) (b) 
right as so affecting the detainee’s capacity to prepare a defence 
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C. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BILL 
 
 
The Parliamentary Joint Committee did not reach a full appraisal of the complex Chapter III 
constitutional issues ultimately affecting the validity of the bill.  
 
 
. Relevant Constitutional powers: Purposive or purposive aspect, with the 
application of a proportionality test.  
 
The most likely heads of constitutional power which would support the bill are powers over 
Defence (s.51 vi), External Affairs (s.51 xxix) (for the implementation of international treaties), the 
Executive power (s.61) with the express Incidentals power (s.51 xxxix) and the implied power to 
protect the polity. 
 
These powers are purposive in nature or have a purposive aspect. The purpose of the relevant law 
“must be collected from the instrument in question, the facts to which it applies and the 
circumstances which called it forth”: Stenhouse v Coleman (1944) 69 CLR 457. Accordingly, the 
relevant test developed by the High Court in characterisation as to constitutionality is to ask 
whether the legislation in question is reasonably capable as being considered appropriate and 
adapted to an identified constitutional purpose under the relevant head of power. In other words, 
the High Court applies a proportionality test to these powers assess the constitutionality of the 
relevant law. 
 
The High Court has on occasions found that laws based on purposive powers can in fact fail this 
test: see Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79 and Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 
172 CLR 501. 
 
Some sections of the bill eg 34 F (8) “A person who has been taken into custody, or detained, under 
this Division is not permitted to contact, and may be prevented from contacting, anyone at any time 
while in custody or detention” may fail the test of being reasonably capable of being considered 
appropriate and adapted to a relevant identified constitutional purpose. 
 
. Chapter III Commonwealth Constitution immunity on constitutional power 
 
There are constitutional doubts surrounding the administrative capacity to detain Australian citizens 
not involved in or suspected of a criminal offence, save in a relatively limited set of identified and 
exceptional circumstances.  
 
Several judicial statements are important. In the joint judgment of Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ 
in Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 
CLR 1, 27, 28-29 their Honours said: 
 
It would be beyond the legislative power of the Parliament to invest the Executive with 
an arbitrary power to detain citizens in custody notwithstanding that the power was 
conferred in terms which sought to divorce such detention in custody from both 
punishment and criminal guilt. The reason why is that putting to one side the exceptional 
cases to which reference is made below, the involuntary detention of a citizen in custody 
by the State is penal or punitive in character and, under our system of government, exists 
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only as an incident of the exclusively judicial function of adjudging and punishing 
criminal guilt…. 
 
There are some qualifications which must be made to the general proposition that the 
power to order a citizen be involuntarily confined in custody is, under the doctrine of 
separation of judicial from executive and legislative powers enshrined in our 
Constitution, part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth entrusted exclusively to 
Ch III courts. [The exceptional cases of permissible involuntary detention then listed 
are]: 
 
. Committal to custody awaiting trial 
 
. Mental illness 
 
. Infectious disease 
 
. Traditional powers of the Parliament to punish for contempt 
 
. Military tribunals to punish for breach of military discipline 
 
. [and in Lim itself, the Court was concerned with provisions of the Migration Act 1958 
(Cth) which authorised the detention of non-citizens for a specified period for the 
purposes of expulsion or deportation. The validity of those provisions as an exercise of 
the constitutional power conferred in relation to aliens by s.51 (xix) of the 
Commonwealth Constitution was upheld by the Court] (emphasis added) 
 
Their Honours then observed: 
 
Otherwise…the citizens of this country enjoy, at least in times of peace, a constitutional 
immunity from being imprisoned by Commonwealth authority except pursuant to an 
order by a court in the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth. [Their 
Honours stated it was unnecessary to consider whether the defence power in times of war 
will support an executive power to make detention orders such as that considered in Little 
v Commonwealth (1947) 75 CLR 94] 
 
According to Gummow J in Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 161-162 
 
A power of detention which is punitive in character and not consequent upon adjudgment 
of criminal guilt by a court cannot be conferred upon the Executive by a law of the 
Commonwealth. 
 
The question whether a power to detain persons or to take them into custody is to be 
characterised as punitive in nature, so as to attract the operation of Ch III, depends on 
whether those activities are reasonably capable of being seen as necessary for a 
legitimate non-punitive objective. The categories of non-punitive, involuntary detention 
are not closed (emphasis added) 
 
This test adopted by Gummow J is not necessarily identical to that formulated by the other justices 
in Lim:  
 
“reasonably capable of being seen as necessary”: Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ at 33 
 
“does not exceed what is reasonably necessary”: Gaudron J at 58 
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“reasonably necessary”: McHugh J at 65, 71 
 
 
However, in Lim, McHugh J noted (1992) 176 CLR 1, 71: 
 
Although detention under a law of the Parliament is ordinarily characterised as punitive 
in character, it cannot be so characterised if the purpose of the imprisonment is to achieve 
some legitimate non-punitive object…But if imprisonment goes beyond what is 
reasonably necessary to achieve the non-punitive object, it will be regarded as punitive 
in character. (emphasis added) 
 
 
Gaudron J in Kruger considered that a general immunity from involuntary detention did not derive 
from Chapter III, but that a broad immunity similar to, but not precisely identical with that 
identified by Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ in Lim, arose from and applied to constitutional 
powers under s.51 of the Commonwealth Constitution. Gaudron J stated: 
 
I am of the view that the true constitutional position is that, subject to certain exceptions, 
a law authorising detention in custody, divorced from any breach of the law, is not a law 
on a topic with respect to which s.51 confers legislative power. If, as I think, the 
legislative power conferred by s.51 of the Constitution does not extend to authorise laws 
conferring a power of detention divorced from criminal guilt, unless they are laws with 
respect to the topics or perhaps some of the topics to which reference has been 
made…(1997) 190 CLR 1, 110-111. 
 
 
. The argument as to Chapter III constitutional invalidity 
 
The character of a law is derived from its terms ie its text of the law and also from the operation 
and effect of the law: Bank of NSW v Commonwealth (Bank Nationalisation Case) (1948) 76 CLR 
1.  
 
It is an arguable constitutional point that applying the test derived from the above Chapter III cases, 
the detention authorised under the ASIO Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (Cth) is not 
reasonably capable of being seen as necessary for a legitimate non punitive or non penal objective, 
and is therefore unconstitutional as infringing Chapter III. 
 
This conclusion is supported by the following factors: 
 
. The preventative detention aspect or practical effect of the legislation, separated from an 
adjudgment of criminal guilt, found explicitly in 34NA (4) (a) “it is likely that the person will 
commit, is committing or has committed a terrorism offence” Note document “Proposed 
Government Amendments” Recommendation 10: “…If a person has reached an age (ie 14) where 
they would have full criminal responsibility (and hence where the criminal law views them as 
capable of committing crimes and responsible for such crimes) then it is reasonable to detain and 
question the person in relation to a possible or potential terrorist incident” 
 
. The preventative detention aspect or practical effect of the legislation, separated from an 
accusation of crime, found expressly in 34 C (3C) (b) that “it is likely that a terrorism offence is 
being committed, or is about to be committed, and may have serious consequences” and found 
implicitly in 34C (3) (c) “may alert a person involved in a terrorism offence that the offence is 
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being investigated”. The latter behaviour would ordinarily constitute an offence under s.101.6 of 
the Commonwealth Criminal Code: “A person commits an offence if the person does any act in 
preparation for, or planning, a terrorist act”, or alternatively, such a person would be liable under 
the complicity and common purpose provisions (s.11.2 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code) as 
aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the s.101.1 Commonwealth Criminal Code offence of “A 
person commits an offence if the person engages in a terrorist act”. 
 
The preventative detention aspect of 34NA (4) (a) and 34C (3) (c) is confirmed by the use 
immunity provisions of 34 G (9) which makes inadmissible in evidence against the person in 
criminal proceedings (a) anything said by the person, while before a prescribed authority for 
questioning under a warrant, in response to a request made in accordance with the warrant for the 
person to give information and (b) the production of a record or thing by the person, while before a 
prescribed authority for questioning under a warrant, in response to a request made in accordance 
with the warrant for the person to produce a record or thing. 
 
It should be recalled that in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 98 
the particularly focused preventative detention provisions of the NSW Community Protection Act 
were contrasted by Toohey J as “not an incident of the exclusively judicial function of adjudging 
and punishing criminal guilt” with what might have been acceptable as “a system of preventive 
detention with appropriate safeguards, consequent upon or ancillary to the adjudication of guilt” 
 
. The availability of other schemes of collecting intelligence that is important in relation to a 
terrorism offence from persons not suspected of a terrorism offence (as demonstrated in the 
operation of the schemes in other jurisdictions such as Canada and the UK)  
 
. The inadequacy of the rights and protections accorded to detained persons eg 34 H (lack of an 
independent interpreter), 34 J (treatment with humanity and with respect for human dignity and not 
being subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment not defined by reference to Arts 7 and 10 
ICCPR General Comments 20 and 21) and 34 K (no entitlement of copy of video recordings of 
appearance before prescribed authority for questioning under a warrant and other matters which the 
prescribed authority directs to be video recorded, and in circumstances where the detainee, held 
incommunicado and without access to legal advice, is potentially liable for a range of offences 
under 34 G relating to the giving of information and producing things, carrying a penalty of five 
years imprisonment with evidential burdens on the detainee.) 
 
 
. Referral of power from the states under s.51 (xxxvii) Commonwealth 
Constitution 
 
On 5 April 2002, the States and Territories agreed to refer power to the Commonwealth to support 
federal counter-terrorism laws of national application. Whilst such a referral may remedy any 
existing gaps found in the Commonwealth’s defence, external affairs, executive and incidentals 
powers, and the implied power to protect the polity, powers referred by the states to the 
Commonwealth are still “subject to this Constitution” under s.51 of the Commonwealth 
Constitution. 
 
Accordingly, the referred state legislative powers would be subject to the Chapter III implications 
regarding judicial power. It is of relevance that a Chapter III case, Kable v Director of Public 
Prosecutions (1996) 189 CLR 1, state preventative detention legislation enacted by the NSW 
Parliament under the authority of the NSW Constitution, which conferred functions on the NSW 
 10
Supreme Court, was found to be incompatible with the exercise of Chapter III federal judicial 
power. 
 
 
D. DEVELOPING AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL 
 
. Alternatives to incommunicado detention 
 
The Joint Parliamentary Committee proceeded on the assumption that the present bill could be 
salvaged with amendments.  
 
As a consequence, the Committee did not engage in any substantial way with alternative models for 
obtaining information relating to terrorism from non- suspects. In particular, the response in the 
United Kingdom and Canada offer important guidance for Australia.   
 
The ASIO Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (Cth) should be scrapped and new 
legislation drafted to ensure anti-terrorism measures are constitutional and adhere to the values, 
practices and rights of a pluralist democracy, the very things undermined by terrorism. 
 
. Recent overseas legislation: obtaining information from persons not suspected 
of terrorism offences 
 
Less draconian anti-terrorist measures have been adopted after September 11 in the United 
Kingdom and Canada. Instead of incommunicado detention, a model with a clear focus on actual or 
potential criminal activity has been followed in both jurisdictions. Reasonable suspicion is required 
for arrest for a variety of terrorism offences, allowing for custodial questioning of actual suspects. 
 
Incommunicado detention of non-suspect citizens is not part of the United Kingdom or Canadian 
approach. The carefully calibrated legislative measures in the United Kingdom and Canada have 
been developed in societies with practical experience of terrorism. Britain has experienced 
Northern Ireland terrorism for over 30 years and in 1970, Canada experienced the major October 
crisis in Quebec.  
 
United Kingdom and Canadian legislation must respectively comply with provisions of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Practical 
experience of incommunicado detention for terrorism in those countries shows that abuses and 
miscarriages of justice can occur. 
 
 The measures introduced in the United Kingdom and Canada provide adaptable alternatives to the 
Australian bill. 
 
 
. Canadian legislation: Anti-terrorism Act 2001 (Canada) 
 
The Anti-terrorism Act 2001 (Canada) provides for a judicially conducted non-custodial 
investigative hearing (along the model of a Royal Commission) for the purposes of gathering 
information relevant to actual or future terrorism offences. 
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A person may be ordered to attend the hearing to answer questions where there are reasonable 
grounds of belief relating to the actual or future commission of a terrorism offence, and that direct 
and material information relating to those offences or the whereabouts of suspected persons may be 
revealed through questioning that person. 
 
In relation to the future commission of a terrorism offence, reasonable attempts must also have 
been made to obtain from the person concerned the information that is direct and material to the 
future terrorism offence. 
 
The Canadian legislation compels attendance and remaining in attendance of the person named in 
the order at the investigative hearing and the production and examination of things in possession of 
that person at the investigative hearing. Questioning on oath of the person and production of things 
named in the order is done before a judge by the Attorney-General’s agent. 
 
Persons ordered to attend a hearing are obliged to answer questions put to them. There is a use 
immunity provision against use or receipt in criminal proceedings against that person of answers 
given or things produced in the investigative hearing 
 
The Canadian legislation contemplates arrest by warrant of non-suspects only in situations such as 
where they will evade service of the order to attend, are about to abscond, fail to attend or remain in 
attendance at a hearing.  
 
Relevant sections of the Canadian Anti-terrorism Act 2001 are included in the appendix to this 
submission. 
 
 
. A suggested Australian model based on the Canadian legislation 
 
An Australian adaptation of the Canadian legislation would need to account for limitations on 
constitutional power under Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution, particularly in relation 
to the performance of non-judicial functions by judicial officers in their personal capacity as 
offending the incompatibility doctrine: Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1. 
 
An Australian model based on the Canadian non-custodial investigative hearing could feasibly be 
structured around the existing provisions of the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) by instituting a 
standing Royal Commission, with a series of Commissioners (with appropriate legal standing and 
reputation), and with provisions for suspension or adjournment of commission proceedings and for 
the calling of persons to give evidence and produce documents at short notice. 
 
The provisions of the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) in the power to summon witnesses and 
take evidence, the requirements of witness attendance and the production of documents, 
requirements to give evidence and produce documents and things and use immunity provisions for 
witnesses in subsequent civil and criminal proceedings are very similar to the investigative hearing 
provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code.   
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. United Kingdom legislation: Terrorism Act 2000 (UK), as amended by the Ant-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK) 
 
The Terrorism Act 2000 (UK) as amended by the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 
(UK) has a minimum requirement for arrest of reasonable suspicion that a person is concerned in 
the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.  
 
Importantly, after September 11, separate non-terrorist, arrestable offences have also been created.  
 
An offence exists of failing to disclose information which a person knows or believes might be of 
material assistance in preventing terrorist acts or in securing the apprehension, prosecution or 
conviction of terrorists. The onus is placed upon a person to provide that information, which they 
are able to do in a non-custodial situation: S.38B Terrorism Act 2000 (UK). 
 
An arrestable offence is also created of a person disclosing information likely to prejudice a 
terrorist investigation or interfere with material relevant to a terrorist investigation: s.39 Terrorism 
Act 2000 (UK). 
 
Relevant sections of the Terrorism Act 2000 (UK) are included in the appendix to this submission. 
 
. A suggested Australian model based on the United Kingdom legislation 
 
. Create offences in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) of: 
 
(a) non disclosure of information, without reasonable excuse, where a person actually has 
information which he or she knows or believes may reasonably assist in preventing an 
imminent terrorist attack resulting in probable loss of life or serious injury 
 
(b) wilful disclosure of information to persons conducting or proposing to conduct (or 
concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation) of an imminent terrorist attack 
which will prejudice the investigation of, or frustrate the obtaining of information, that is 
intended to prevent an  imminent terrorist attack 
 
(Modelled these offences on similar offences in s.38B and s.39 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (UK) as 
amended by the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK)) 
 
. Define the key terms of the above to be quite precise about the very limited circumstances of the 
offence and the subsequent basis of operation of warrant, arrest and investigation powers eg: 
 
 “Imminent”= within seven days (or other appropriate period) according to a reasonable assessment 
of all available intelligence available from other intelligence sources; 
 
 “terrorist attack” = widespread or systematic use or threat of the use of serious force or application 
of serious harm in the commission of a terrorist act (as defined in s.100.1 of the Commonwealth 
Criminal Code)  
 
 “serious injury”= injury that is neither trivial nor temporary 
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. The offences are as Commonwealth offences, subject to, and integrated with, the system of 
protections of Parts 1AA, 1C and 1D of the Commonwealth Crimes Act. 
 
. However, as in the present bill, ASIO should not have arrest powers. This is critical to distinguish 
it from being a political police force, to maintain a focus on genuine terrorist related matters, to 
ensure efficient use of resources and to maintain its reputation and integrity following the Hope 
Commission reforms.  
 
. Arrest pursuant to a warrant is carried out by Federal, State or Territory police. 
 
. It is also critical to ensure that these powers are used only to obtain information from persons who 
are not suspected of a terrorist offence. The present bill allows the circumvention and bypassing of 
the Crimes Act arrest, investigation and charging provisions of persons reasonably suspected of 
committing an offence against a law of the Commonwealth ie a terrorism offence. 
 
. It is also critical that arrest for the non disclosure and disclosure offences have an additional check 
and balance of arrest only by warrant so as to discourage intimidation and coercion by the 
suggestion of criminal charges against persons merely thought to have information, and to ensure 
that such persons are afforded the opportunity to provide such information in a non-custodial 
situation. 
 
. Therefore, for the offences so created of non disclosure and disclosure, arrest should only be 
available by warrant: 
 
. Warrant issued by a Federal Court judge (ie legislation must specifically say that you cannot 
arrest for this offence without a warrant and it must make clear that only the police can arrest- this 
retains the features of the present bill) 
 
. Affidavit for warrant presented from the Director General to the Attorney General, and then 
submitted for consideration by a Federal Court judge must establish: 
 
(a) reasonable suspicion of having committed a non disclosure or disclosure offence as per 
above 
 
(b) that other legal means have been tried to obtain the intelligence which the affidavit for a 
warrant now seeks in relation to the disclosure or non disclosure offences; 
 
(c) the information sought is reasonably believed to be of a nature or quality that will directly 
contribute to the prevention of an imminent terrorist attack; 
 
(d)  that the person on whom the warrant will be served has declined a reasonable opportunity 
to provide the information sought in a non-custodial situation and that specific details are 
provided in the affidavit of the person so declining 
 
. Person arrested is at all times in the custody of Federal State or Territory police, is questioned by 
Federal Police, perhaps with ASIO able to contribute to questioning  
 
. Protections of Parts 1AA, 1C and 1D of Crimes Act (Cth) apply to person in custody for alleged 
non-disclosure or disclosure offence, with minor modifications incorporating recommendations of 
the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence Services An Advisory Report on the Australian 
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Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002, suitably adapted 
to the newly created offences. 
 
 
E. FURTHER ADVERSE IMPLICATIONS FOR CIVIL AND POLITICAL 
RIGHTS IN THE AMENDED BILL 
 
 
. New and persistent problems with the amended bill 
 
The Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee in its report on the bill advised: 
 
In the event that the Government accepts all the PJC’s recommendations, the Committee 
recommends that the Bill, as amended, proceed without further review by this 
Committee. In the event that the recommendations are not adopted, the Committee 
reserves the right to revisit its consideration of this Bill. 
 
The amended bill passed by the House of Representatives on 24 September 2002 falls far short of 
implementing all of the Parliamentary Joint Committee’s recommendations. Aside from the central 
issue of incommunicado detention, examined in detail in Part A of this submission, significant 
problems for civil and political rights persist in the amended bill. 
 
Furthermore, the minimalist approach to incorporating some, but not all, of the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee’s recommendations creates major new problems for civil and political rights. 
 
An examination follows of the key offending sections of the amended bill. 
 
. Approved lawyers: 34AA 
 
There is no reference within this section to the fact that a list of potential approved lawyers should 
be those nominated by the Law Council of Australia and\or the State and Territory Law Societies. 
 
There is no reference to the fact that a panel of approved lawyers be established allowing a detainee 
a choice of approved lawyer from that approved panel 
 
The Attorney General should not be permitted to decline the appointment of a person as an 
approved lawyer other than on the basis of an adverse or qualified security assessment appealable 
before the Security Appeals Tribunal. However, s.34 AA(2)(c)(ii) allows the Minister to consider 
“any other material that the Minister considers is relevant to the question whether to approve the 
practitioner”.  
 
The inclusion of this provision (effectively unreviewable because of national security evidentiary 
considerations and AAT and judicial reticence in national security matters) has the potential to 
undermine the integrity, appropriate expertise and independence of the system of a panel of 
approved lawyers, necessary to safeguard the interests of the detainee. 
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. Issuing authorities: 34A and 34AB 
 
These provisions permit appointment by regulations of a class of persons to be issuing authorities 
for the purposes of issuing warrants ie it allows the appointment by regulation of non-judicial 
officers. 
 
The intention behind these provisions appears to allow a replacement issuing authority in the event 
that the High Court finds that the use of judicial officers as issuing authorities as unconstitutional 
under the doctrine of incompatibility in Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348 and Wilson v 
Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1. 
 
However, the provision is not restricted to such an eventuality. For example, the Attorney-General 
could be declared as a member of a class of persons eg “Cabinet Ministers” by regulations creating 
issuing authorities. The other intelligence gathering warrant powers under the Act are exercised by 
the Attorney General and are not judicial warrants. 
 
The definition of “issuing authority” in 34A (a) should be amended to require a declaration of 
unconstitutionality of judicial office holders to act as issuing authorities, and a prohibition about 
members of the executive being appointed as issuing authorities. 
 
. Prescribed authorities: 34B: Use of untenured AAT members 
 
The bill persists with the use of untenured AAT appointees as prescribed authorities. Such 
appointees, if aspiring to reappointment, are vulnerable to informal institutional and other 
pressures, or the perception thereof, in exercising the range of functions and discretions once the 
warrant for interrogation has been issued.  
 
It is no coincidence that the explosion in telecommunications interception warrants has occurred 
when the task of issuing the warrants has been assigned to AAT members. 
 
All AAT members undertaking prescribed authority duties other than the issue of warrants should 
hold tenured positions to a fixed retiring age of 65 or 70 years under s.8 of the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) and preferably be appointed at Deputy President level. 
 
The Attorney General has said the bill will only be used as a measure of last resort. Accordingly, 
this proposal should only necessitate the making of a small number of new tenured appointments or 
the conversion to tenure of some existing appointments and ensuring sufficient geographical 
distribution of these AAT appointees throughout the Commonwealth.  
 
This measure is intended to provide greater capacity to resist Executive and bureaucratic pressure 
in the exercise of functions and discretions, to lessen the seeking of preferment or reappointment to 
higher levels of seniority in the AAT, and to provide public reassurance of non-judicial 
independence. 
 
I formed this conclusion after a confidential discussion on 1 May 2002 with a former Senior 
Member of the AAT (who was on a term appointment and not re-appointed) about the informal 
internal workings of the tribunal. 
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This measure would also ensure that in the event of a declaration of unconstitutionality by the High 
Court of the proposed persona designata involvement of judicial officers in issuing warrants, a 
higher level of independence would already be in existence for the likely substitution of AAT 
appointees as the issuing authority.  
 
. Adopting acts in relation to a written statement of procedures to be followed in 
exercise of authority under warrants: 34C (3)(ba) and 34C (3A) 
 
To ensure that an acceptable human rights standard is achieved, the Protocols should be enacted by 
way of a disallowable regulation and the bill should be amended to reflect this.  
 
The present arrangement in 34C (3A) (d) of presentation of the statement to each House of the 
Parliament is inadequate. 
 
On the adopting acts for the written statement of procedures, see also the observations under the 
heading “Humane treatment of persons specified in the warrant: 34 J”, below. 
 
. Ability to contact approved lawyer: 34C (3B) and (3C) 
 
The ability of the Minister to delay access to an approved lawyer for up to 48 hours has already 
been shown to be an unacceptable breach of international human rights standards.  
 
Paragraph 7 of Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (UK) confers a right upon a person detained 
to consult a solicitor as soon as is reasonably practicable, privately and at any time. Paragraph 8 of 
Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (UK) permits authorisation of a delay to the paragraph 7 right 
where there are reasonable grounds for believing certain specified consequences will eventuate, but 
the right cannot be delayed for more than 48 hours. 
 
However, the Terrorism Act 2000 (UK) simply refers to a “solicitor”. The approved, security 
cleared legal adviser system under the Australian bill, and the offences created for unauthorised 
communications by a legal adviser under s.34 U (7), confirm that the delay of access to a lawyer for 
up to 48 hours is unnecessary, excessive and inappropriate. 
 
Accordingly, there are no reasonable grounds to delay such contact with an approved lawyer under 
the Australian bill. It should also be recalled that the UK legislation refers to the provision of legal 
advice to persons reasonably suspected as being concerned in the commission, preparation or 
instigation of acts of terrorism. It does not permit detention of citizens not suspected of an offence. 
 
The lack of entitlement to an approved lawyer in the bill during the first 48 hours effectively 
nullifies the right to seek judicial review before a federal court. 
 
. Concept of “contact” with an approved lawyer when in custody or detention: 
no specificity of right to presence during interrogation: 34C (3B) and (3C) and 
34U 
 
The bill uses the ambivalent term “contact” with an approved lawyer. There is no specificity as to 
the right of continuous presence of the approved lawyer during interrogation by ASIO. Continuous 
presence is essential to ensure welfare of the detainee and is another reason why the detainee 
should be allowed a choice from a panel of approved lawyers. 
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The bill should be amended to confer a right to the presence of an approved lawyer at all times 
during interrogation by ASIO before the prescribed authority, rather than simply assuming that this 
right will be observed by implication from the legislation by a prescribed authority. 
 
. Non-custodial warrant for questioning: 34D (2) (a): access to legal adviser 
and\or approved lawyer 
 
This provision requires a specified person to appear before a prescribed authority for questioning 
under the warrant immediately after the person is notified of the issue of the warrant, or at a time 
specified in the warrant. 
 
The bill should be amended so as to confer access to, provision of, and presence of, the person’s 
own legal adviser and\or an approved lawyer during such non-custodial questioning before the 
prescribed authority  
  
. Exercise of right to seek remedy before federal court relating to warrant or 
treatment of person in connection with the warrant: 34E (3) 
 
Where access to an approved lawyer is withheld for up to 48 hours under 34C (3C), the right of the 
detainee to seek review and a remedy from a federal court relating to the warrant or to individual 
treatment (see 34E (1)(f)), when first appearing before the prescribed authority, and the right 
having to be advised by the prescribed authority at least once every 24 hours (see 34E (3)) becomes 
meaningless without that availability of legal representation to advise the detainee, contact the 
court, initiate proceedings and represent the detainee. 
 
The prescribed authority should be required to advise the person in the presence of, and with the 
opportunity to consult with, an approved lawyer that they have the right to seek judicial review 
by a Federal Court judge at each 24 hours of detention and at every time a subsequent warrant is 
sought and to be represented by an approved lawyer in such an application for judicial review. 
 
. Prohibition on contact and prevention from contact by detainee of anyone at 
any time whilst in custody or detention: 34F (8) 
 
Under this provision, the whereabouts of a detainee may remain unknown to relatives, friends, 
employers and others, so that the detainee disappears from the community for a formal period of up 
to one week. There is no right for the detainee to notify such persons of his or her whereabouts. 
 
Even under the Terrorism Act 2000 (UK), a person detained on criminal reasonable suspicion 
grounds has the right to notify a friend, relative or other interested person of their whereabouts: 
Schedule 8, Paragraph 6. This right to notify may be suspended for specified reasons (such as 
alerting persons about to engage in a terrorist act) but only for a maximum of 48 hours: Schedule 8, 
Paragraph 8 and s.41 (3) 
 
Again, it is important to keep in mind that under the Australian bill, the person detained is not 
reasonably suspected of a terrorism offence, yet is not accorded the right to notify a person of their 
whereabouts which is available under the UK legislation.  
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. Retention of evidential burdens: 34G  
 
The requirement that the defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to 34G (4) that the person 
does not have the information and 34 G (7) that the person does not have possession or control of 
the record or thing should be deleted. Such an amendment will provide a further safeguard for the 
detainee. 
 
. Presence of Inspector General of Intelligence and Security during 
interrogation: 34HA 
 
The bill and the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 should be amended to 
specifically state that the Inspector General has a right to be present at any interrogation conducted 
under the warrant powers.  
 
This measure is necessary to clarify the right to attend as being based on definite grounds other 
than the present Inspector General’s personal interpretation of s.34T of the bill. 
 
Given that amendments to the Intelligence Services Act proposes that a review be conducted of the 
ASIO Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 after three years of operation, the bill should be 
further amended to require: 
 
(a) in the first year of operation, for the Inspector General to attend a specified number of 
interviews conducted under the warrant powers 
(b) in the second and third years of operation, for the Inspector General to attend at least a 
nominated percentage eg one quarter or one third of all interviews. 
 
This attendance will have a number of benefits, including providing an empirical basis for the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee review of the legislation after three years 
 
. Humane treatment of persons specified in the warrant: 34J 
 
The language of Clause 34 J (2) derives from Arts 7 and 10 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and more generally from the Geneva Conventions. A similar provision exists 
in the Commonwealth Crimes Act: see s.23Q 
 
The bill should specify that the protocols developed through the consultative process should be 
consistent with, and developed in conformity with, Article 7 and 10 of the International Covenant 
of Civil and Political Rights, the prohibition against cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment and the interpretative General Comments of the UN Human Rights Committee on 
Article 7 (currently General Comment 20) and Article 10 (currently General Comment 21). 
 
The Commonwealth Human Rights Commissioner, appointed under the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Act 1986 (Cth), should play a central role in drafting these protocols to ensure 
independent expertise necessary to meet Australia’s international law obligations. 
 
 The formulation of a written statement of procedures to be followed in the exercise of authority 
under warrants issued under section 34D through “adopting acts” (34 C 3A) specifically omits the 
consultation of any specialist international human rights law expertise as part of the adopting acts, 
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which is absolutely essential to ensure compliance with the ICCPR articles. The bill should be 
accordingly amended. 
 
This measure is designed to ensure compliance with the ICCPR and to avert the need for individual 
detainees to make complaints under the Optional Protocol to the UN Human Rights Committee in 
Geneva for alleged breaches of the ICCPR in the administration of the legislation. 
 
. Rules for persons who are at least 14 but under 18: “likely that the person will 
commit, is committing or has committed a terrorism offence”: 34NA (4)(a) 
 
The inclusion of this section highlights the conceptual confusion underpinning the bill: it openly 
combines the disparate and irreconcilable objectives of intelligence gathering, preventative 
detention and criminal investigation.  
 
This section is a transparent indication why the bill should be scrapped and new anti-terrorism 
investigatory and intelligence gathering legislation drafted on a conventional criminal law, human 
rights compliant model, drawing upon and adapting to Australian circumstances the Canadian and 
United Kingdom provisions for investigating persons suspected of terrorism offences and persons 
not suspected of terrorism offences from whom intelligence is sought. 
 
. Offences of contravening safeguards: 34NB requirement of knowledge, but not 
recklessness or negligence 
 
The requirement of knowledge of the contravention sets too high a standard of culpability in 
offences against persons detained who are not suspected of any criminal offence.  
 
Furthermore, the requirement of knowledge will encourage a laxity in implementing systems for 
the observance of procedural safeguards, including compliance with the written statement of 
procedures to be followed in the exercise of authority under s.34 D warrants. It will make 
investigation and prosecution of alleged offences exceedingly difficult and deterrence of offences 
improbable. 
 
The standard of recklessness used for offences in the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) 
Act 2002 should be adopted, namely alternative offences with intention (in this case knowledge) 
and recklessness. The standard of negligence should also be applied in the alternative to these 
offences.  
 
All of these concepts are defined in Division 5: Fault elements in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) 
 
Graded penalties and the opportunity for alternative verdicts for knowledge, recklessness and 
negligence should be included in the bill. 
 
. Offences of contravening safeguards: identity of alleged offenders: 34NB 
 
The application of penalty clauses will only be effective if ordinary police investigation and 
prosecution before a court can actually be carried out. In this respect the ability to identify the 
allegedly offending ASIO officer at each stage of the investigatory, prosecutorial and curial 
processes is critical and a discretion allowing the withholding of such an identity will frustrate 
those processes. 
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The operation of a penalty clause needs to be properly reviewed alongside the existing prohibitions 
against the publication of the identity of an officer of the Organisation contained in s.92 of the 
ASIO Act 1979 (Cth), which carries a penalty of imprisonment for one year. 
 
S.92 needs to be amended to ensure that investigatory, prosecutorial and curial processes work in 
relation to the 34 NB offences.  
 
What is the current procedure for the disclosure of ASIO personnel identities where there are 
allegations of impropriety or illegality? Is that procedure adequate to make the penalty clauses 
actually enforceable? Does the bill need to be amended to facilitate investigations and prosecutions 
and give practical substance to the offences arising when safeguards are contravened? 
 
The circumstances of A v Hayden (1984) 156 CLR 532 (the Sheraton raid) and the report of Justice 
Hope (Royal Commission on Australia’s Security and Intelligence Agencies Report on the Sheraton 
Hotel Incident Canberra, AGPS 1984) are instructive in this respect. 
 
. Status of prescribed authority and immunity in performance of duties: 34SA 
  
The legislation should do more to ensure compliance with the s. 34J requirement that the detainee 
must be treated with humanity and with respect to human dignity, and not be subject to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
 
A personal basis of liability should be established for the prescribed authority should be established 
for exercising discretions and functions in conformity with these standards.  Sections 34 J, 34 NB 
(4) and 34 SA should be amended to render a prescribed authority liable to the s.34 NB (4) offence 
of contravening this relevant safeguard and to remove the relevant immunity for this aspect in 
relation to performance of functions under the warrant. 
 
This is important in general compliance terms, but more particularly given that the bill 
contemplates incommunicado detention for up to seven days. 
 
. Involvement of lawyers: monitoring of contact: 34U (2) 
 
Unlike the UK Terrorism Act 2000, which refers to a “solicitor”, the Australian bill adopts a 
scheme of security cleared approved lawyers which removes the justification for contact with the 
approved lawyer to be monitored by a person exercising authority under the warrant. 
 
Paragraph 7, Schedule 8 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (UK) commences with a RIGHT that a detained 
person shall be entitled to consult a solicitor as soon as is reasonably practicable, PRIVATELY, and 
at any time 
 
Paragraph 9, Schedule 8 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (UK) CREATES AN EXCEPTION TO THE 
RIGHT of private consultation with the solicitor, by providing for a direction that in certain 
circumstances, the right of a detained person to consult with a solicitor shall only be within the 
sight and hearing of a qualified officer. Such circumstances include inter alia alerting of a person 
making it more difficult to prevent an act of terrorism, or apprehension, prosecution or conviction 
for a terrorism offence, or interference with the gathering of information about the commission, 
preparation and instigation of acts of terrorism. 
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Such situations should not arise under the Australian approved lawyer arrangements and hence the 
justification for monitoring lawyer-detainee communications does not exist. The bill should be 
accordingly amended allow for approved lawyer-client private communications. 
 
. Involvement of lawyers: prohibitions on intervening in questioning, addressing 
the prescribed authority: 34U (4) 
 
Under 34 U (4), the legal adviser may not intervene in questioning of the subject or address the 
prescribed authority. 
 
The document “Proposed Government Amendments” under Recommendation 6 states “The lawyer 
may not intervene in the questioning or address the prescribed authority except to request 
clarification of an ambiguous question.” It then argues “ This is consistent with practice in relation 
to compulsory examinations under the taxation and ASIC legislation, and the Trade Practices Act.” 
 
This statement appears at odds with the ASIC legislation and is potentially misleading. 
 
Under Division 2 of the Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth), a notice 
requiring appearance for examination may be served on a person when certain conditions are 
satisfied.  The relevant section of the ASIC legislation is substantially narrower than the present 
bill. It reads: 
 
23  Examinee’s lawyer may attend 
 (1) The examinee’s lawyer may be present at the examination and may, at such times during it as 
the inspector determines: 
 (a) address the inspector; and 
 (b) examine the examinee; 
about matters about which the inspector has examined the examinee. 
 (2) If, in the inspector’s opinion, a person is trying to obstruct the examination by exercising rights 
under subsection (1), the inspector may require the person to stop addressing the inspector, or 
examining the examinee, as the case requires. 
Note: Failure to comply with a requirement made under this subsection is an offence (see section 63). 
 (3) An offence under subsection 63(4) relating to subsection (2) of this section is an offence of 
strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
 
Clearly, this legislation permits the lawyer to address the inspector about a broad range of matters 
relating to the questioning of the person and enables the lawyer to put questions to the person. The 
controls on such questioning are merely the timing of the questions asked of the inspector and the 
examinee, and a prohibition against obstructing the examination. 
 
34 U (4) of the bill should be amended to allow a legal adviser to ask a similar range of questions, 
subject to issues of timing and a prohibition against disruptive intervention deliberately intended to 
frustrate the intelligence gathering process. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The ASIO Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (Cth) should be wholly discarded and new 
legislation drafted to ensure anti-terrorism measures are constitutional and adhere to the values, 
practices and rights of a pluralist democracy, the very things undermined by terrorism. 
 
The new legislation should apply the human rights standards in terrorism legislation of comparable 
democracies such as Canada and the United Kingdom and develop an alternative, non-custodial 
mechanism applicable to persons not suspected of any terrorism offence who may have information 
relevant to the prevention of a terrorist attack. 
 
I would be pleased to provide further information in support of this submission and to attend a 
hearing of the Committee if requested. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
 
(Dr) Greg Carne 
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